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Civil Rights-Academic Freedom, Secrecy and Subjectivity as
Obstacles to Proving a Title VII Sex Discrimination Suit
in Academia
Sex discrimination in academic employment has been found to be both
appalling and blatant.' In 1958 the consensus of the academic community was
that "[w]omen scholars are not taken seriously and cannot look forward to a
normal professional career. ' 2 Since 1962 the federal government has at-
tempted to combat sexism in academic employment through three major stat-
utes3 and an executive order.4 The most important of these efforts was the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,5 which amended Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII originally exempted educational institu-
tions from the federal mandate forbidding employment discrimination. 6
When the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 was debated, however,
Congress concluded that public policy did not justify exemption of educa-
tional employees.from Title VII coverage.7 Senator Allen argued that to sub-
ject academic institutions to federal antidiscrimination legislation would be to
risk their academic freedom,8 but this argument was rejected by a substantial
margin.9
Despite the clear intent of Congress to eliminate sex discrimination in
1. The United States Congress has recognized the acute nature of the problem:
It is difficult to imagine a more sensitive area than educational institutions, where the
youth of the Nation are exposed to a multitude-of ideas and impressions that will
strongly influence their future development. To permit discrimination here would, more
than in any other area, tend to promote existing misconceptions and stereotyped catego-
rizations which in turn would lead to future patterns of discrimination.
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act
of 1971, S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971).
2. T. Caplow & R. McGee, The Academic Marketplace 226 (1958).
3. The three major pieces of antidiscrimination legislation are as follows: 1) the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending Civil Rights
Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), which forbids em-
ployment discrimination by public and private educational institutions; 2) Education Amend-
ments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-907, 86 Stat. 235 (codifie4, as amended, at 20 U.S.C.§§ 1681-1686 (1976) and amending scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.), which forbids discrimina-
tion under any educational program receiving federal funds; and 3) the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
Pub. L. No. 88-38,77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976)), which prohibits sex discrimi-
nation in employee remuneration.
4. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Comp.) (amending Exec. Order No.
11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Comp.), which forbids employment discrimination by employers
holding government contracts.
5. Pub. L. No. 92-261,86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979)).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241.
7. House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act
of 1971, H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2137, 2155.
8. 118 Cong. Rec. 946, 1993 (1972). Senator Allen was joined by Senator Ervin in his at-
tempts to have religious and academic institutions exempted from Title VII coverage. See id. at
1977-95.
9. Id. at 1995. The vote was 55-25.
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employment in federally funded institutions, courts have shown reluctance to
intervene in academic personnel decisions. 10 A number of cases have been
brought since antibias legislation was made applicable to colleges and univer-
sities in 1972.11 In the early cases, plaintiffs were generally denied relief. The
theme of the early decisions, as set forth in Green v. Board of Regents 12 and as
emphasized in Faro v. New York University,13 was that courts should abstain
from intervening in hiring, promotion, tenure and salary decisions made by
colleges and universities.
As the judiciary's experience with academic employment matters in-
creased, however, its articulated policy began to change. In January 1978 the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided Sweeney v. Board
of Trustees.14 In Sweeney a state college professor alleged sex discrimination
as the basis for her failure to obtain promotion at an earlier date and for the
disparity between salaries of males and females on the faculty. In backdating
Dr. Sweeney's promotion and concomitantly adjusting her salary for the inter-
vening years, the court voiced "misgivings over. . . [the recurrent] notion that
courts should keep 'hands off' the salary, promotion, and hiring decisions of
colleges and universities."' 5 The court acknowledged that decisions concern-
ing hiring, promotion and tenure rights require subjective evaluation and that
such evaluation can most appropriately be made in the academic setting but
cautioned against "permitting judicial deference to result in judicial abdica-
tion of a responsibility entrusted to the courts by Congress. That responsibil-
ity is simply to provide a forum for the litigation of complaints of sex
discrimination in institutions of higher learning as readily as for other Title
VII suits.' 16
10. E.g., State Div. of Human Rights v. Columbia Univ., 39 N.Y.2d 612, 619, 350 N.E.2d
396, 399, 385 N.Y.S.2d 19, 23 (1976); Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights, 38 N.Y.2d
28, 33, 339 N.E.2d 880, 884, 377 N.Y.S.2d 471, 478 (1975). See generally O'Neill, God and Gov-
ernment at Yale: The Limits of Federal Regulation of Higher Education, 44 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 525,
526 (1975). It is noteworthy that, in general, the most inefficient and ineffective strategy for
achieving an equal employment policy is litigation of individual cases, in part because judges vary
in their degree of commitment to equal employment. Ratner, Equal Employment for Women:
Summary of Themes and Issues, in Equal Employment Policy for Women 419,421 (R. Ratner ed.
1980).
11. E.g., Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904
(1977); Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974); Green v. Board of Regents, 474
F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973) (suit under § 1983); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp.
1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (dissolving preliminary injunction issued in 359 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Pa.
1973)); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857 (D. Vt. 1976).
12. 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973). A female associate professor claimed she was refused pro-
motion to full professor because of her sex. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that
"the University's standards are matters of professional judgement" and that the findings of the
trial court must be sustained unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 596.
13. 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974). A female Ph.D. was terminated from the university after
she refused to accept an appointment she regarded as a demotion. The court stated that "[o]f all
fields, which the federal courts should hesitate to invade and take over, education and faculty
appointments at a University level are probably the least suited for federal court supervision." Id.
at 1231-32.
14. 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1978).




In November 1978 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania analogized academic institutions to industry in Kunda v.
Muhlenberg College.17 In Kunda a female college teacher alleged that sex dis-
crimination was the basis for the college's refusal to grant her promotion and
tenure. The court declared that "[t]he decision to grant or deny a promotion
to a college faculty member is not substantially different from a similar deci-
sion in business or industry."' 8 The court recognized that under Title VII the
"disparate treatment" theory of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green19 and the
"disparate impact" theory of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States2" are applicable to academic institutions as well as to industry. 2' Ap-
plying these theories, the Kunda court concluded that the denial of tenure to
the female teacher was the result of the college's discriminatory acts in failing
to inform her that a master's degree was required for promotion.22 The court's
remedy was to mandate that the college should allow the female teacher two
years to complete the required degree and, upon completion, award her
tenure.2
3
Sweeney and Kunda are significant for their potential effect on challenges
to sex discrimination in academia. The Sweeney court expressly rejected the
prevailing abstention policy of Faro and was the first court specifically to or-
der promotion as the appropriate remedy when a female had been a victim of
discrimination in academia.24 The Kunda court was the first to present a thor-
ough, systematic analysis in which criteria used to evaluate the legality of em-
ployment decisions in industry were made applicable to employment decisions
in academia.
The United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the ap-
plicability of the academic freedom defense to enforcement of legislation en-
suring equal opportunity in appointment, promotion and tenure decisions. 25
17. 463 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Pa. 1978), afld, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).
18. Id. at 307.
19. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendant's actions were based on a discriminatory motive. See text accompanying notes
29-38 infra.
20. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Discrimi-
natory motive is not an essential element under a disparate impact theory. The "plaintiff need
only show that the employment standards under scrutiny have a statistically significant discrimi-
natory impact." 463 F. Supp. at 307.
21. 463 F. Supp. at 306-07.
22. Id. at 313.
23. Id.
24. Broad, Ending Sex Discrimination in Academia, 208 Science 1120, 1121 (1980).
25. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the United
States Supreme Court addressed the legality of race-conscious admissions programs. Justice Pow-
ell, announcing the judgment of the Court, cited with approval the four essential university free-
doms which Justice Frankfurter had expounded in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study). 438 U.S. at 312. See notes 69-72 and accompanying text
infra. Justice Powell perceived that deciding who may be admitted to study may constitute a
constitutional interest protected by the first amendment but concluded that there are limits to the
exercise of this aspect of academic freedom. 438 U.S. at 314. In Justice Powell's view, academic
freedom could be used to justify a flexible admissions plan premised on many factors including
race and ethnic status. Id. In contradistinction, establishing a quota-type methodology for selec-
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It is reasonable, however, to anticipate that the Court would apply the criteria
set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green26 and in International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States27 to evaluate an allegation of employment
discrimination brought against a college or university. Although these cases
involve industrial employers, lower federal courts have already applied their
reasoning in employment discrimination cases against academic institutions.28
If the McDonnell Douglas formula2 9 for evaluating discrimination in hir-
ing is applied, the female who alleges disparate treatment may establish a
prima facie case by proving that she is a member of a protected group, that she
applied and was qualified for a job for which the academic institution was
seeking applicants, that she was rejected despite her qualifications, and that
the academic institution continued to seek applicants from persons with her
qualifications. McDonnell Douglas does not require that the plaintiff provide
"direct proof of discrimination"; it merely requires a showing that "rejection
did not result from the two most common legitimate reasons on which an em-
ployer might rely to reject a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of
qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought."'30 In accordance
with the McDonnell Douglas formula, a female denied promotion may estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination by proving that she was a faculty
member, that she was qualified for promotion, that she was considered for and
denied promotion, and that males with comparable qualifications were
granted promotion.31 A female denied tenure may establish a prima facie case
by showing the first three elements of a cause of action for discrimination in
promotion.32
After the female has established her prima facie case of discrimination in
tion of a student body to achieve educational diversity is not permissible even under the guise of
academic freedom. Thus, the Supreme Court did not permit academic freedom to be a defense for
discrimination. In Cannon v. The University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), a 43-year-old wo-
man brought a private suit alleging that rejection of her application for medical school was made
on the basis of sex. The Association of American Medical Colleges, in an amicus brief, argued
that to imply a private right to sue would be inconsistent with the constitutional interest in aca-
demic freedom. Association of American Medical Colleges Weekly Report #79-19, May 15, 1979.
The Supreme Court considered the academic protest to be a policy issue and held that the woman
had a right to bring a private suit in the federal courts.
26. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
27. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See note 20 supra.
28. See notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
29. The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i)
that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802.
30. 431 U.S. at 358 n.44.
31. Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 463 F. Supp. at 307.
32. Id. at 308. An additional requirement in a tenure case may be the showing that males
with similar qualifications were granted tenure during the time in which the female was consid-
ered or that there were significant procedural irregularities in the processing of the female's tenure
application. Id. See Huang v. College of the Holy Cross, 436 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1977);
EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152 (D. Mass. 1975).
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hiring, promotion or granting of tenure, the academic institution has the bur-
den of presenting a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the employment
decision." 33 If the institution rebuts the prima facie case, the female has the
burden of showing "that the defendant's stated reason. . . was pretextual"34
and that the disparate treatment to which she was subjected "constituted pur-
poseful discrimination on the basis of sex." 35
The ultimate burden of persuasion rests on the plaintiff.3 6 The academic
institution may attempt to hinder plaintiffs preparation of her case by resort-
ing to three major obstacles: (1) secrecy in decision-making processes;
(2) subjectivity in evaluation criteria; and (3) notions of academic freedom.
Direct evidence of sex discrimination will be rare because of the level of so-
phistication in academia. 37 Inferential proof of discriminatory motive may be
used, but the plaintiff must present that proof in her case.38
Academic decisions concerning appointment, promotion and tenure tra-
ditionally have been veiled in secrecy. Paralleling the increase in the number
of discrimination suits filed against colleges and universities has been an in-
crease in resistance on the part of academicians to revealing the bases for em-
ployment decisions.39 For example, in EEOC v. University of New Mexico,40
an associate professor alleged illegal discharge because of national origin and
sought access to personnel files during the preparation of his case. The univer-
sity refused to comply with a subpoena duces tecum requesting files of present
and previously terminated members of the college faculty. The United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico, however, ruled that the univer-
sity must produce the personnel files even though the college considered them
to be confidential and sensitive.41 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia also narrowed the use of secrecy in academic decision-making in
33. 463 F. Supp. at 309-10.
34. Id. at 310. Accord, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804.
35. 463 F. Supp. at 311. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at
335 n.15.
36. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d at 177. See generally Divine, Women in the
Academy: Sex Discrimination in University Faculty Hiring and Promotion, 5 J.L. & Educ. 429
(1976).
37. 569 F.2d at 175. But see Broad, supra note 24, at 1121 (describing a situation in which a
University of Minnesota chemistry professor, as part of his evaluation of a female applicant for a
faculty position, declared in writing, "I have to state that she would have problems because she is
a woman. I guess I am a male chauvinist pig.").
38. 569 F.2d at 177.
39. Middleton, Academic Freedom vs. Affirmative Action: Ga. Professor Jailed in Tenure
Dispute, Chronicle of Higher Educ., Sept. 2, 1980, at 1, col. 2. See also Fields, The U.S. vs.
Berkeley over Affimnative Action, Chronicle of Higher Educ., Sept. 22, 1980, at 4, col. 1 (The
Labor Department's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs has contended that the
University of California at Berkeley has "engaged in maneuver after maneuver frustrating investi-
gatory efforts." For example, the university has refused to reveal confidential letters of recom-
mendation to investigators in the Office of Civil Rights.). Cunningham & Brodie, Academic
Freedom & Tenure: St. Mary's College (California), 62 Am. Ass'n U. Professors Bull. 70, 74
(Spring 1976) (The President of the College "had received, and intended to follow, the advice of
his legal counsel not to give reasons so as to make it difficult for Professor Versluis to litigate
against the denial of tenure in a civil court suit.").
40. 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 653 (D.N.M. 1973), afid, 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1974).
41. Id. at 654.
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State ex rel McLendon v. Morton .42 In McLendon an assistant professor al-
leged that she was denied due process when the college denied tenure. Mc-
Lendon had six years of full-time employment in academic teaching, thus
meeting the objective eligibility criteria enunciated by the college.43 The court
held that she had a sufficient entitlement to prohibit denial of tenure on the
issue of competency without procedural due process, including a notice of the
reasons for denial and an opportunity to rebut the evidence relevant to those
reasons.4
Academicians argue that destroying secrecy in academic employment de-
cisions chills candor in discussions and criticisms of colleagues' professional
competence.45 This argument, however, is of little merit. There is no evidence
of a chilling effect resulting from federal legislation requiring higher educa-
tional institutions to open their academic files to students.46 Furthermore, in-
creased openness would not increase liability for defamation since evaluations
made in good faith and as part of institutional responsibilities are privileged.47
Openness in decision-making processes would alleviate suspicion that employ-
ment decisions are based on impermissible reasons, and, such fears mitigated,
females would not feel compelled to resort to litigation for relief.48
Another obstacle facing the female alleging sex discrimination in aca-
demic employment is the use of subjective criteria in academic decisions con-
cerning appointment, promotion and tenure; the use of subjectivity makes it
difficult to prove discriminatory motive. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois pointed out in Lewis v. Chicago State Col-
lege49 that teaching ability is clearly a matter of subjective judgment.50 In
42. 249 S.E.2d 919, 925 (W. Va. 1978).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 926. A similar conclusion was reached by the United States Supreme Court in
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
45. See Gellhorn & Boyer, The Academy as a Regulated Industry, in Government Regula-
tion of Higher Education 25, 36-37 (W. Hobbs ed. 1978).
46. Id. at 40. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g
(1976), provides that students who attend institutions of higher education must be given access to
their education records and must be provided an opportunity for a hearing to challenge informa-
tion in those records that is "inaccurate, misleading, or otherwise in violation of the privacy or
other rights of students." Id. § 1232g(a)(2). See generally Schatken, Student Records at Institu-
tions of Post-Secondary Education: Selected Issues Under the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974, 4 J.C. & U.L. 147 (1976-77).
47. See Stevens, Evaluation of Faculty Competence as a "Privileged Occasion," 4 J.C. &
U.L. 281 (1976-77). See also Rugenstein v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 422 F. Supp. 61
(E.D. Wis. 1976) (not defamatory to call a professor an old biddy not suitable for promotion);
Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (not defamatory to evalu-
ate a professor as below average); Petroni v. Board of Regents, 115 Ariz. 562, 566 P.2d 1038 (1977)
(not defamatory for department head to make an unfavorable recommendation regarding promo-
tion and tenure); Byars v. Kolodiziej, 48 IML App. 3d 1015, 363 N.E.2d 628 (1977) (not defamatory
to say a professor does not deserve tenure). But see Dauterman v. State-Record Co., 249 S.C. 512,
154 S.E.2d 919 (1967) (defamatory to say a professor drinks excessively).
48. Van Alstyne, Furnishing Reasons for a Decision Against Reappointment: Legal Consid-
erations, 62 Am. Ass'n U. Professors Bull. 285, 285 (Summer 1976).
49. 299 F. Supp. 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
50. "A professor's value depends upon his creativity ... his teaching ability, and numerous
other intangible qualities which cannot be measured by objective standards." Id. at 1359. See
also Fishbem, The Academic Industry-A Dangerous Premise, in Government Regulation of
1982]
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Peters v. Middlebury College5 l another district court permitted the use of sub-
jective criteria in an academic reappointment decision because "evaluation of
* . . teaching ability is necessarily a matter of judgment. '52 Judicial approval
of the use of subjective criteria is consistent with decisions involving use of
subjective evaluations in industrial settings. For example, in Rogers v. Interna-
tionalPaper Co. ,3 a nonacademic racial employment discrimination case, the
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit ruled that subjective criteria were not
unlawful per se.54 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in
the industrial case of Rowe v. General Motors Corp., , cautioned that subjec-
tive criteria provide "a ready mechanism for discrimination. '5 6
Because discriminatory practices can easily be disguised,57 the use of sub-
jective criteria has been one of the major obstacles for women in proving their
claims against academic institutions. The judiciary has been reluctant to inter-
ject its opinion into matters of promotion and tenure, preferring to "leave such
decisions to the Ph.D.'s in academia."'58 For example, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, in Clark v. Whiting,59 refused to make a comparative
inquiry into either the quantity or the quality of the work of a male faculty
member who alleged an equal protection violation, stating that "courts may
not engage in 'second-guessing' the University authorities in connection with
faculty promotions." 60 This decision reflects the traditional belief that courts
should defer to the academician's judgment on qualifications for appointment,
promotion or tenure.61 At the same time, the'judiciary recognizes that sex
discrimination in academic employment cannot be prevented unless courts are
willing to become involved once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. For
Higher Education 57, 62 (W. Hobbs ed. 1978) (a scholar cannot be evaluated by quantitative and
visible standards).
51. 409 F. Supp. 857 (D. Vt. 1976).
52. Id. at 868.
53. 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975) (a civil rights action brought against a wood-paper mill
alleging racial discrimination in employment and promotion in skilled craft jobs).
54. Id. at 1345.
55. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972) (blacks alleged racial discrimination in promotion and trans-
fer practices at auto plant).
56. Id. at 359.
57. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d at 175. "When overt discrimination becomes
illegal, it often goes underground in the beliefs of employers, labor leaders, educators, etc. Covert
forms of discrimination are traps that spring on women, like blacks, along paths marked by 'equal
opportunity' signs." M. Butler & W. Paisley, Women and the Mass Media 30 (1980). See gener-
ally Dipboye, Arvey & Terpstra, Sex and Physical Attractiveness of Raters and Applicants as
Determinants of Resume Evaluations, 62 J. Applied Psychology 288 (1977) (raters' evaluations of
applicants' resumes are affected by sex and physical attractiveness); Schmitt & Hill, Sex and Race
Composition of Assessment Center Groups as a Determinant of Peer and Assessor Ratings, 62 J.
Applied Psychology 261 (1977) (ratings of women appear to vary according to the proportion of
men in the evaluation group).
58. Broad, supra note 24, at 1121.
59. 607 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1979) (male associate professor sued university because of denial
of his request for promotion to full professor in violation of his equal protection and due process
rights).
60. Id. at 640.
61. See Green v. Board of Regents, 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973) (academic standards are
matters of professional judgments); Lewis v. Chicago State College, 299 F. Supp. 1357 (N.D. III.
1969) (academic promotion decisions are not usually justiciable).
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example, the court in Clark stated that the judiciary may review a university's
evaluations of quantity and quality of scholarly work performed by a female
alleging sex discrimination. 62 And in Sweeney the court allowed several wit-
nesses to testify that Dr. Sweeney had been qualified for promotion several
years before it was granted by the university and that her qualifications had
not substantially changed between the time she was denied promotion and the
time, several years later, when she was granted promotion via normal univer-
sity peer review.63
A third major obstacle facing the female alleging sex discrimination by
colleges and universities is the notion of academic freedom. Academic free-
dom, aspracticed in American institutions,64 was adapted from the nineteenth
century German ideals of Lehrfreiheit (freedom to teach) and Lernfreiheit
(freedom to learn).6 5 Freedom to teach ensured that faculty could conduct
research independently and convey the results of that research, as well as
62. 607 F.2d at 640-41.
63. 569 F.2d at 178 n.18.
64. A senior member of the University of North Carolina faculty defined academic freedom
as the "removal of fear from independent thought: freedom to teach, to do research, to participate
in politics. With this freedom comes the ability to invent, to experiment, to test, to explore, to
disagree." Interview with Dr. Paul D. Brandes, Professor of Speech Communication, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 10, 1980).
An official statement, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure,
was formulated by the Association of American Colleges and the American Association of Uni-
versity Professors (AAUP), and remains effective. It provides as follows:
Academic Freedom
(a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the
results, subject to the adequate performance of his other academic duties; but research
for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the
institution.
(b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he
should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no
relation to his subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other
aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.
(c) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned profession, and
an officer of an educational institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he should
be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the commu-
nity imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer, he
should remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his
utterances. Hence, he should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate re-
straint, should show respect for the opinion of others, and should make every effort to
indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.
Menard, "May Tenure Rights of Faculty be Bargained Away?", 2 J.C. & U.L. 256, 267 (1974-75).
Courts have frequently relied on this 1940 Statement and its interpretation by the AAUP in
deciding disputes arsing in the academic community. See, e.g., Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am.,
527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (court upheld AAUP s interpretation of the "suitable position" rule
in the 1940 Statement); Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1975) (appellate court ob-
served that a university regulation which allegedly was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad
had been adapted almost verbatim from the 1940 Statement; the court concluded that since the
regulation had been interpreted in an advisory letter by the AAUP "any overbreadth resulting in
facial invalidity" was eliminated); Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972), afl'd in
part, rev'd in part, 512 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1975) (district court referred to the requirements of
"appropriate restraint" contained in the 1940 Statement and held that certain language used by a
faculty member was not protected by the first amendment).
65. See R. Hofstedter & W. Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United
States 275 (1955); Nisbet, Max Weber and the Roots of Academic Freedom, in Controversies and
Decisions 103, 119-21 (C. Frankel ed. 1976).
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speak openly and freely of other matters, to their students. In Germany this
privilege was not extended to citizens outside the university, nor was it ex-
tended to faculty when they were outside the university.66 In the United
States, however, the federal constitution guarantees all persons the fundamen-
tal rights of Lehifreiheit and Lernfreiheit.67 Because of the fundamental differ-
ences in the individual liberties afforded citizens of Germany and the United
States, academic freedom in the United States has not been considered a right
independent of the laws of the land as it was in Germany.68 An academic
freedom interest, however, derived from the rights of association and expres-
sion guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and by the fourteenth amendment, was
expressly recognized in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.69
In Sweezy a faculty member refused to relate the content of a lecture he
had delivered at the university. The Supreme Court, in dicta, stated that
"[t]eachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding." 70 The Court feared that
state inquiry into a faculty member's teaching might chill the academic envi-
ronment. Justice Frankfurter wrote a forceful concurring opinion in which he
set forth "'the four essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study."71 Justice Frankfurter's remarks,
however, should not be interpreted to mean that academic freedom can be
used as a defense to all legislative or judicial intervention in academic mat-
ters.72 In Sweezy a faculty member's political autonomy was being invaded
and the countervailing state interests were minimal. Accordingly, resort to the
notion of academic freedom was appropriate.
66. R. Hofstedter & W. Metzger, supra note 65, at 389. See generally Fuchs, Academic Free-
dom-Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 431 (1963); Devel-
opments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045 (1968).
67. Comment, Academic Freedom-Its Constitutional Context, 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 600, 603
(1968).
68. "As a result of this constitutional 'incorporation,' the proposition that academic freedom
should be considered a right with independent character as it was in Germany has not been gener-
ally accepted as a sound legal principle in the United States." Id.
"As significant as academic freedom is in our American tradition, no court has squarely held
that academic freedom is a distinct and legally enforceable independent right absent and beyond
constitutional guarantees." Brown, Tenure Rights in Contractual and Constitutional Context, 6
J.L. & Educ. 279, 297 (1977). But see Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional
Right, 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 447,455 (1963); Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regula-
tion of University Hiring, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 879, 881 (1979).
69. 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
72. See id. at 265 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter stated:
Inquiry pursued in safeguarding a State's security against threatened force and violence
cannot be shut off by mere disclaimer. . . . But the inviolability of privacy belonging to
a citizen's political loyalties has so overwhelming an importance to the well-being of our
kind of society that it cannot be constitutionally encroached upon on the basis of so
meagre a countervailing interest of the State as may be argumentatively found in the
remote, shadowy threat to the security of New Hampshire allegedly presented in the
origins and contributing elements of the Progressive Party and in petitioner's relations to
these.
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Two years after Sweezy the United States Supreme Court ruled in Baren-
blatt v. United States73 that the House Committee on Un-American Activities
could investigate subversive activities in education. The Court was sensitive to
congressional intrusion into the constitutionally protected areas of "academic
teaching-freedom and its corollary learning-freedom" 74 but held that pub-
lic interest superseded individual and academic immunity.75 Subsequently, in
Shelton v. Tucker,76 the Supreme Court took the opportunity to articulate
clearly a two-pronged test for evaluating the appropriateness of the govern-
ment's intrusion into constitutionally protected personal liberties. According
to the Court the government purpose (1) must be legitimate and substantial
and (2) cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.77
In 1967, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,78 the Court declared that aca-
demic freedom is a "special concern of the First Amendment" and that laws
which cast a shadow over the robust exchange of ideas in the classroom would
not be tolerated.79 The following year, in Pickering v. Board of Education,80
the Supreme Court upheld a teacher's first amendment guarantee of freedom
of speech. Although such protection could have been included specifically
within the concept of academic freedom, the Court stated that the state had no
greater interest in monitoring the speech of the teacher-citizen than it did in
monitoring the speech of the citizenry in general. 81 In short, the Supreme
Court has generally been quick to vindicate the constitutional rights of acade-
micians. It has stricken loyalty-oath requirements as violative of the first
amendment 82 and promoted autonomy by prohibiting restrictions on curricu-
lum and activities. 83 Academicians have been further protected by the Court's
73. 360 U.S. 109 (1959). During interrogation before a congressional committee, Barenblatt
refused to answer questions concerning his political or religious beliefs, as well as other personal
and private affairs. His refusal was based on the first amendment specifically and on academic
freedom in general.
74. Id. at 112.
75. Id. at 124-34.
76. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). A state statute required teachers to file an affidavit annually listing
the organizations to which they belonged or regularly contributed during the preceding five years;
the Supreme Court held that such forced disclosures impaired a person's right of free association.
77. Id. at 488.
78. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
79. Id. at 603.
80. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The Court held that speaking on issues of public importance may
not be used as the basis for dismissing a teacher from his teaching position.
81. Id. at 568.
82. In Whitehall v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967), plaintiff who was offered a teaching position at
the University of Maryland, challenged the constitutionality of a state loyalty-oath requirement.
The Supreme Court stated, "We are in the First Amendment field. The continuing surveillance
which this type of law places on teachers is hostile to academic freedom." Id. at 59-60. But see
Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971), in which a primary school teacher was dismissed
from her job for refusing to sign a loyalty oath. The Court ruled that requiring all teachers to
fledge to support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida is acceptable.
Id. at 208.
83. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court struck down a state law that for-
bade teaching any modem language other than English to children below the eighth grade. The
Supreme Court did not mention academic freedom per se but stated that "[tlhe American people
have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance
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recognition of their freedom of association rights,8 4 due process rights in dis-
missal proceedings8 5 and freedom of speech rights in political activity.8 6
Since federal antidiscrimination legislation was made applicable to col-
leges and universities in 1972, both academicians and nonacademicians have
become increasingly alarmed by what they allege is an infringement of aca-
demic freedom by the federal government. The presidents of four leading uni-
versities in Washington, D.C., have asserted that "government interference is
disrupting higher education to a point where institutional autonomy is seri-
ously threatened."8 7 The president of the National Academy of Science has
told members of the academy that there is a conflict between academic excel-
lence and equal opportunity.88 A faculty member of the University of Geor-
which should be diligently promoted." Id. at 400. The Court considered the state law to "materi-
ally. . . interfere with the calling of modem language teachers" and reversed the state supreme
court's holding of its constitutionality. Id. at 401.
In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), a secondary school teacher challenged the con-
stitutionality of a state law that made it unlawful for a teacher in a state-supported academic
institution to teach evolution. The Supreme Court did not discuss academic freedom but held the
law unconstitutional as a violation of the fourteenth amendment as it embraces the first amend-
ment's prohibition of state laws establishing a religion. In White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533
P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975), police officers posed as students and enrolled in the state
university. They engaged in covert practice of recording class discussions, compiling police dos-
siers and intelligence reports. Without discussing academic freedom, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia stated, "als a practical matter the presence in a university classroom of undercover officers
taking notes to be preserved in police dossiers must inevitably inhibit the exercise of free speech
both by professors and students." Id. at 767, 533 P.2d at 229, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
84. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). University faculty members alleged
that the state's teacher loyalty laws and regulations were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
stated, "[olur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcen-
dent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a
special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom." Id. at 603.
85. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). An associate professor was summarily
discharged because he refused to answer questions concerning his membership in the Communist
Party on the grounds that his answers might tend to incriminate him. The New York City Charter
provided for termination of employment under such circumstances. The Supreme Court did not
discuss academic freedom but merely held that the teacher's summary dismissal violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), a college teacher who had been employed for
four successive years under a series of one-year contracts was, dismissed. The Supreme Court
concluded that he may have a sufficient property interest to warrant a due process hearing during
which he could be informed of the grounds for dismissal and allowed to challenge the sufficiency
of those grounds. But see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), in which a teacher was
hired by the university for one academic year. He was not rehired the next year. The Supreme
Court held that under the circumstances he did not have a property interest in being rehired
sufficient to require a due process hearing.
86. Picketing v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). A teacher was dismissed because he
wrote a letter published in a local newspaper criticizing the school board's allocation of school
funds. Not addressing academic freedom per se, the Supreme Court stated that "it cannot be
gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from those of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees." Id. at 568.
87. Lacovara, How Far Can the Federal Camel Slip Under the Academic Tent?, 4 J.C. &
U.L. 223, 224 (1976-77).
88. Broad, supra note 24, at 1121-22. Dr. Philip Handler, president of the National Academy
of Science, stated:
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gia alleged academic freedom as the reason for his refusal to obey a court
order requiring him to reveal the bases for his vote on the promotion and
tenure of a female assistant professor.89 The University of California at
Berkeley refused to provide confidential letters of recommendation to civil
rights investigators in the Department of Labor.90
Academicians have resisted review of their employment practices by ar-
guing that such review violates their academic freedom.9 ' Historically, acade-
micians have enjoyed independence from regulation far greater than their
counterparts in industry.92 This independence is based on the premise that
educators must be afforded autonomy in teaching, research, and publishing in
order to preserve freedom and integrity of thought.93 External supervision of
employment decisions, however, in no way interferes with a faculty member's
privilege of teaching, conducting research or publishing, the areas traditionally
protected by academic freedom. In contradistinction, an institution's refusal
to hire, promote or grant tenure to a female because of her sex directly inter-
feres with that female's privilege of teaching, conducting research and publish-
ing and is a definite violation of her academic freedom. Furthermore, even
The government has sought and obtained university records concerning the details of
individual faculty appointments--explicit affirmation by government that it considers
other criteria to be as significant as academic competence, if not more so, in apointments
to the faculty. Yet nothing can so damage the future of a university as an appointment
to the faculty of anyone less than the best whom the university might otherwise have
attracted to its company.
Id. at 1122.
89. Middleton, supra note 39, at 1, col. 2. Professor James Dinnon, under the pretext of
academic freedom, disobeyed a court order to reveal how he voted and the bases for his vote on
the promotion and tenure of Dr. Maija S. Blaubergs. On July 3, 1980, when Mr. Dinnon surren-
dered himself to initiate his three-month jail term, he wore full academic regalia to demonstrate
that "in effect, the federal government will be locking up the University of Georgia." Id. Dr.
Blaubergs had filed suit for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
90. Fields, supra note 39, at 4, col. 1. The University of California at Berkeley continued its
refusal to reveal confidential letters of recommendation to the Office of Civil Rights investigators,
and the Department of Labor threatened to deny the university $25 million in federal contracts.
9 1. But see McGill, Is Federal Regulation a Threat to Academic Freedom?, Columbia To-
day, March 1977, at 2, 34-36. President McGill of Columbia University acknowledged that the
principle of federal regulation is not a threat to academic freedom-he claims the threat is the
regulators.
92. See Winder, Government Rulemaking: Any Hope for Simplification?, Chronicle of
Higher Education, Dec. 20, 1976, at 5, col. 5.
93. Brown, supra note 68, at 300. See also Searle, Two Concepts of Academic Freedom, in
The Concept of Academic Freedom 86 (E. Pincoffs ed. 1975). However, faculties must accept
specific teaching responsibilities and must conform classroom teaching to the subject matter
promulgated in the course description. Libelous or obscene writing is not protected even when
presented as a work of scholarship. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
The traditional definition of academic freedom has recently been expanded to encompass
institutional autonomy and faculty self-rule. J. Fleming, G. Gill & D. Swinton, The Case for
Affirmative Action for Blacks in Higher Education 84 (1978).
[T]his expanded meaning of academic freedom translates largely into a direct attack on
only one government regulation: affirmative action. No other type of government regu-
lation or legislation that is applicable to higher education-pension rights and retirement
benefits, health and safety regulations, equal student aid and veterans benefits, and stu-




assuming that the institution's academic freedom is invaded and that such
freedom is a constitutionally protected liberty, the government's intrusion is
permissible under the Shelton test. 94 The goal of ensuring that jobs in
academia are assigned on the basis of merit is legitimate. Moreover, the gov-
ernment's means of accomplishing this goal does not broadly stifle personal
liberties, and the goal cannot be achieved by a more narrow means, such as
requesting voluntary nondiscrimination.
Although the status of women in academic institutions has improved
since antidiscrimination legislation was enacted,95 an unjustified disparity
continues to exist between female and male faculty members. For example,
seventy-two percent of men, but only forty-six percent of women, hold tenured
appointments, 96 and female scientists are paid approximately seventeen per-
cent less than their male colleagues at all faculty levels.97 Despite the contin-
ued inequalities, the judiciary has been conservative in its response to
allegations of sex discrimination in academia. During the past three years,
however, the courts have developed standards, analogous to those applicable
in industry, for evaluating alleged discriminatory acts. The courts delve be-
hind the college's or university's final decision, inquire into the reasons for the
decision, and scrutinize the bases on which the decision was made. But the
judiciary refrains from acting as a "super-tenure" committee imposing its own
evaluations of a female's qualifications for academic appointment, promotion
or tenure. The court's aim is not to impose its own judgment concerning who
will hold academic appointments but rather to ensure that academic employ-
ment decisions are not based on illegal sexually-discriminatory reasons. Such
action by our courts is both necessary and appropriate.
R. JOYCE BURRISS GARRETT
94. See notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra.
95. See Greenberger, The Effectiveness of Federal Laws Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in
Employment in the United States, in Equal Employment Policy For Women 108 (R. Ratner ed.
1980).
96. Status Improves for Women Scientists in Academe, Chemical and Engineering News,
May 7, 1979, at 6.
97. Comm. on the Educ. and Employment of Women in Science and Eng'r, Comm'n on
Human Resources, U.S. Nat'l Research Council, Climbing the Academic Ladder: Doctoral Wo-
men Scientists in Academe (1979).
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